Spacing has changed the game.

NBA offenses today look nothing like they did in the ’90s—more threes, better efficiency, and smarter shot selection. But why? The key lies in how teams use space to create and capitalize on advantages.

In this article, we break down what spacing really is, why it matters, and how to optimize it for maximum offensive impact.

What spacing really is, and how to optimize it?

 

“BALL IS QUICKER THAN DEFENDERS”

This observation was one of the few sentences my coach relentlessly hammered during practice when I started playing basketball. And I repeated it myself when I began coaching. Rehashed like a mantra during fast-break situations, it seemed like an obvious truth: a pass allow the ball to cross the court faster than a defender, even while running hard; therefore, it is worthwhile, whenever possible, to outrun the defense and score easy baskets by passing the ball forward.

However, it’s only recently that I have truly understood the deep implications of this statement. This reality is a core point not only of fast-break, but of the game in general as one of the keys to understanding one of the most important and debated concepts within the basketball microcosm, especially over the last decade. This concept, which will be the focus of this article, is spacing.

 

THE RACE FOR OPTIMIZATION

 

Watching a regular NBA game from the late 1990s and from the early 2020s is undeniably a radically different experience. Saying that this evolution arouses debate is probably an understatement: a recent video by Ben Taylor for Thinking Basketball perfectly summarizes both the development of the game and the myriad of reactions it provokes, particularly among former NBA players. Among the criticisms expressed, the most reprobate aspect is likely the share of three-point shots in the overall shot distribution. A quick look at the stats factually confirms this drastic shift: during the 1998/1999 season, NBA teams took on average 16,8% of their shots from beyond the three-point line; this number reached 39,4% in the 2023/2024 season.

Part of this debate is purely aesthetic: it is entirely valid to have a preference for a particular style of play from a given era (even though the three-point shot itself only provides a partial indication of the type of play developed, namely its outcome). However, one key question remains: if the objective of the game – scoring more points than the opponent – and the framework in which it is played – two teams of five players, one ball, a 94 by 50 feet court with hoops set at 10’ – remain permanent, how can we explain such a radical change ? Can this evolution simply be attributed to a passing trend ?

To answer this question, let’s momentarily set aside the complexity of the NBA ecosystem (tanking strategies, individualistic motivations, etc.) to start with a general principle. Everyone involved in the daily operations of an NBA team – players, coaching staff, front office – shares a common goal: outscoring the opposing team as often as possible. From this perspective, the evolution of the game could be considered as the outcome of attempts to optimize offensive efficiency on one hand, and to diminish the opponent’s offensive efficiency on the other, within a given playing environment.

A comparative analysis of NBA statistics from 1998/1999 & 2023/2024 seasons suggests a meaningful correlation: the visual evolution of the game has been accompanied by a huge boost in overall efficiency across the whole league (at the expense of defensive efficiency). The average points scored per 100 possessions indeed increased from 102,2 to 115,3 – a 12,8% rise. By comparing the league’s average Four Factors for these two seasons, we gain further insight into this surge:

 

 

Possessions alike, NBA teams today obtain significantly fewer second-chance opportunities from offensive rebounds and score fewer free throws than they did 25 years ago. However, they turn the ball over less frequently and, most notably, have become far more efficient in their overall shooting accuracy from the field – suggesting that certain factors have a greater influence than others for offensive performance. On this last component, the league-wide progress has been staggering. The Houston Rockets, most efficient shooting team from 1998/1999 season with an effective field goal percentage (eFG%) of 50,6%, would rank 29th in 2023/2024’s NBA right above the Portland Trail Blazers, the least efficient shooting team of 2023/2024 with 50,3%, which would have ranked 2nd in 1998/1999.

That’s the observation. But can we truly establish a causality between these two processes ? If we assume that the eagerness to win as many games as possible has driven NBA teams since the league’s creation, why didn’t this occur earlier ? And why were the efficiency gains primarily achieved on the offensive end ? While the answers are undoubtedly multifactorial, one decisive factor triggered the shift and reshaped the parameters of how the game is played: a rule change, introduced at the beginning of the century.

 

FROM ARTIFICIAL SPACING

 

In the game of basketball, a half-court offensive action can be divided into two phases:

1° The phase of advantage creation which consists of breaking down the defense, mainly by forcing a defensive lapse or generating a mismatch

2° The phase of advantage capitalization which consists of exploiting the created gap to obtain an open shot

While the first phase can take an extensive number of forms, ways to generate an advantage are actually quite limited. The offense has no choice but to create an advantage through:

1° An individual play, which can be:
A) A perimeter isolation
B) A post-up situation

2° A collective play, which can be:
A) An off-ball movement (like a backdoor, involving a ball handler who passes the ball)
B) An on-ball screen
C) An off-ball screen
D) A combination of both (like a spain pick & roll)

Advantage creation therefore requires at least one offensive and at most three, more rarely four players combining simultaneously with the ball to provoke it. Once it’s generated, the ball handler still has to make the right choice in the second phase: shooting himself or passing the ball. On both of those phases, some offensive and defensive players are not directly involved in the main action; however, they still play a crucial role.

This is where the concept of spacing come into play – the spatial configuration of a team when setting up on the court during an offensive possession. More specifically, it refers to the positioning choices of those players who are not directly involved in the main action at a given moment of the possession. This notion is intrinsic to basketball; every offensive action, regardless of the era, the league or the team executing it, having theorized it or not, has always operated within a specific spacing configuration.

In this regard, the period before the 2001/2002 season was on paper a golden era for NBA offenses. A well-established statistical evidence had indeed emerged for a long time: the field goal percentage is generally correlated with shot distance – simply put, the closer a player is to the basket, the higher the probability of making the shot. Yet, the defenders of those players away from the action were not as allowed as they are today to deploy on the court to shrink playing space and restrict access to the eldorado: the area near the basket. A random play form a regular-season game between the Bulls and the Hawks in the 1997-1998 season illustrates this difference:

 

 

What seems a typical defensive coverage today was in fact an illegal defense. On this Michael Jordan (#23) post-up action, Tyrone Corbin (#33) wasn’t allowed to lurk between his own assigned player Scottie Pippen (#33) and the ball handler: they were required to either stay attached to their matchup, or fully commit to a double-team (but obviously authorized to rotate from the advantage created). The four Michael Jordan teammates had therefore for primary responsibility when positioning themselves on the court to stay far enough from the ball to force their defenders to clear the ball handler’s space (and potentially be in position for an offensive rebound).

The removal of this restriction a few years later begets an unprecedented challenge for NBA offenses: how could they continue to consistently generate advantages if those defenders no longer automatically stuck to their assigned matchups ? In other words, how could they maintain spacing when it wasn’t effortlessly guaranteed by favorable rules anymore ?

 

TO ORGANIC SPACING

 

To maintain their ability to draw defensive attention, NBA players – and coaching staff – had to find ways to make these players dangerous enough threats for the defense during both phases of an action. By threat, we mean a scoring opportunity valuable enough to prevent the defense from focusing solely on denying the ball access to areas near the rim. This is an arduous challenge in a sport where shooting percentages tend to decrease as the distance from the basket rises.

At this stage, the distinction between field goal percentage (FG%) and effective field goal percentage (eFG%) – which accounts for the additional value of three-point shots – becomes crucial. In an environment where not all field goals worth the same number of points, what matters is no longer the shooting percentage from a given area, but rather the average points per shot it generates. The existence of the three-point line, therefore, distorts the polarity of the court by creating additional efficient scoring zones beyond just the area near the rim.

This recognition of the court’s multipolarity in terms of efficient scoring zones and its impact on spacing did not happen overnight or even in a linear way. Several teams were ahead of their time : among them Mike D’Antoni’s Suns, Stan Van Gundy’s Magic and of course D’Antoni’s Rockets under the influence of Daryl Morey. However, the trend over the past 25 years is clear: players not directly involved in the main actions were progressively considered as floor spacers. And their positioning on the court now follows a crucial requirement: being able to punish any defensive help, most often from beyond the three-point line.

 

 

Statistics speak for themselves: over the past 25 years, the new preconizations regarding spacing not only contributed to better shooting efficiency for all shots outside the restricted area but has also largely replaced long mid-range shots (which averaged 0,75 points per attempt in 1998/1999 and 0,86 in 2023/2024) with the far more efficient three-point shot (1,01 points per attempt in 1998/1999 and 1,10 in 2023/2024), a gain of approximately 0,25 per shot in both periods. In summary, thanks to this new three-point spacing, teams are taking way more high-value shots outside the restricted area, and converting them more efficiently than ever before.

 

 

Even better: this multipolarity, introduced by the three-point threat, has also led to a surge in efficiency near the hoop. As defenses stretched out to handle those different menaces, finishing at the rim has improved by 11,2% for just a slight decline in frequency. A visual comparison of the opening possessions from Game 1 of the 1999 NBA Finals and Game 1 of the 2024 NBA Finals perfectly illustrates the shift from a unipolar court to a multipolar one: a more spaced-out offense, threatening floor spacers, and in response a widened defense that can no longer focus solely on protecting the paint, ultimately making it more vulnerable.

 

 

 

THE RIGHT PLAYER IN THE RIGHT SPOT

 

This new organic spacing, driven by floor spacers, is inherently fragile. To consistently engage the defense and prevent it from ignoring a player, one key principle emerges: placing the right player in the right spot, where he can punish defensive help with a high-efficiency shot upon receiving the ball, meaning at the very moment he finds himself open.

NBA teams have then opted to position efficient shooters with quick releases in key areas to punish defensive help during or after advantage creation. Here, Gradey Dick capitalizes on Deni Avdija’s ball side stunt on Immanuel Quickley’s drive to the basket:

 

 

Or Grayson Allen, who knocks down a three on the weak side after Anthony Davis steps over to protect the rim on Kevin Durant’s backdoor cut:

 

 

Or the Julius Randle / Donte DiVincenzo duo, using an extra pass to take advantage of the 2-on-1 against Desmond Bane on the weak side, created by Zach Edey’s help on Anthony Edwards’ action:

 

 

The top of the key is also a crucial area for preventing the defense from clogging the space needed to create an advantage through isolation or ball screens. Teams position in this spot players who can punish the defense with a three-point shot, like Dillon Brooks who receives the ball after Austin Reaves helps on the action Fred VanVleet is about to initiate:

 

 

Shooting isn’t the only weapon for a floor spacer positioned on the perimeter. Other profiles are also utilized to exploit defensive help in this area. Here, Donovan Mitchell who takes advantage of Caruso’s closeout to blow by him and get a shot at the rim:

 

 

More broadly, being able to attack a closeout effectively is a valuable weapon for a floor spacer, as seen here with Bennedict Mathurin gaining an advantage over Bogdan Bogdanovic:

 

 

Being able to take advantage of the defense’s inattention to create a scoring opportunity near the rim is also highly effective. Here, Kevin Huerter cuts behind E.J. Liddell for a targeted basket at the rim:

 

 

The floor spacer by the way is not necessarily a player positioned on the perimeter; with the court being multipolar, the paint is also a crucial area for putting pressure on the defense. The Nuggets, for example, have mastered the use of vertical spacing through Aaron Gordon’s presence in the dunker spot:

 

 

It’s also worth noting that off-ball players considered involved in the main action are only so for as long as the advantage is being created; once that is achieved, they revert to being floor spacers like the others and are therefore subject to the same requirements – namely, clearing space for the ball handler and positioning themselves in a high-efficiency area. When Karl-Anthony Towns sets a screen to create an advantage for Jalen Brunson, he immediately relocates to create space for his ball handler and punish Jalen Duren, who remained in help defense in the paint:

 

 

Same principle on this off-ball screen between Deni Avdija and DeAndre Ayton. Once the advantage for his teammate is created and Nick Richards’ help defense is triggered, Ayton makes himself available near the rim for an alley-oop:

 

 

Finally, spacing is not only about positioning floor spacers in their comfort zones, but also about using their threat to pull certain defenders away from theirs. One of the major trends in recent years has been designing spacing specifically to draw the opposing rim protector away from the paint – often by placing the player they are guarding (typically a big man) at the top of the key. This is the case here with Myles Turner, who is tasked with guarding Brook Lopez who’s positioned at the top of the key, forcing the Pacers’ big man to vacate the paint or be punished if he doesn’t:

 

 

This is also the case for Daniel Gafford, who is responsible for guarding Kristaps Porziņģis, placed in the strong-side corner to prevent him from helping on Jayson Tatum’s drive. That defensive task instead falls to the much less imposing Kyrie Irving who’s guarding Jrue Holiday, stationed in the dunker spot:

 

 

All these floor spacers, with their diverse skill sets, are used to legitimize the counter to defensive help by making it both spatially more challenging and more effectively punishable. To such an extent that, in some situations, defenses may even neglect a rule that has historically been a top priority for all NBA teams: preventing open shots near the basket at all costs. This is evident in this Collin Sexton play, where the immediate threat posed by the floor spacers in the corners is enough to allow one of the NBA’s craftiest ball handlers to reach the rim uncontested:

 

 

THE CORE PRINCIPLES OF SPACING

 

Coaching a youth team is particularly interesting because it constrains you to deeply reflect on the essence of what you’re trying to teach. Unlike coaches driving a more experienced roster, we don’t have the luxury of overloading them cognitively, as this would instantly lead to confusion. As a result, teaching spacing isn’t about implementing a vast array of complex systems to run, but rather about synthesizing what you look for into a concise list of fundamental principles to implement.

Those principles, outlined here, are largely inspired by the insights shared by various talented coaches through coaching clinics, books or podcasts interventions. Among them, three current NBA assistants: Ross McMains, coaching for the Boston Celtics; Noah LaRoche, coaching for the Memphis Grizzlies; and Alex Sarama, coaching for the Cleveland Cavaliers – whom I had the privilege of observing firsthand during the summer camp organized in Italy by his structure Transforming Basketball.

First of all, it’s essential to establish a shot quality scale and its explanation to the players. Designed to guide them to understand expectations regarding shot selection in offense, it prioritizes certain shots over others based on their estimated efficiency.

1 – RIM SHOT – To be taken at any moment in the possession when the opportunity arises

2 – 3 POINTS SHOT – To be taken at any moment in the possession when the opportunity arises, unless a rim shot is available

3 – SHORT MIDRANGE SHOT – To be taken in the last 5 seconds of the possession if no better shot is available OR if a player is particularly efficient in this zone

4 – LONG MIDRANGE SHOT – To be taken in the last 5 seconds of the possession if no better shot is available

Two additional elements also seem important to keep in mind to achieve effective results based on this scale. On one hand, the possibility of adjusting it when atypical individual profiles emerge, particularly for players exceptionally efficient in the “short mid-range” zone. On the other hand the insistence on free-throw’s relevance, which holds a unique status since it’s not a field goal but remains, on average, the most efficient shot in basketball (except for the very rare cases of extremely poor shooters).

Once this hierarchy of shooting zones is settled and the notion of floor spacer specified, has to be established a few key guidelines they should follow as much as possible to optimize their team’s spacing, regardless of the level at which the team competes:

 

A – MAXIMIZE THE GAP BETWEEN EACH PLAYER

Each floor spacer is responsible for both clearing the lane to the basket for the current action and maintaining a minimum gap of 10 feet from their nearest teammate at all times. This prevents any defender from effectively guarding two offensive players at once. When preserving this distance isn’t otherwise possible, a cut should be made – here, Vít Krejčí cuts along the baseline to preserve spacing and free up the corner for Zaccharie Risacher after Trae Young creates an advantage:

 

 

B – PRIORITIZE PRESENCE IN HIGH-EFFICIENCY ZONES

Each floor spacer must also focus on finding an open space in a high-efficiency shooting zone, either beyond the three-point line or near the rim (with a maximum of one player in this area). The mid-range zone should only be used as a transition space between these two areas to catch the defense off guard, as demonstrated here by Paul George who takes advantage of Jonathan Kuminga by leaving the three-point area for a backdoor cut:

 

 

C – CONSTANTLY CREATE (AND RECREATE) PASSING ANGLES

Each floor spacer is also responsible for continuously providing the ball handler with a passing option by maintaining clear angles at all times. This applies to floor spacers positioned on the perimeter, like Tyler Herro here, who constantly moves to free himself from Andre Jackson Jr.’s defense:

 

 

But this also applies to floor spacers positioned near the rim, like Nikola Vučević who initiates movement to provide a passing angle for Ayo Dosunmo after Kyle Lowry’s rotation:

 

 

At last, it concerns ball handlers once they have drawn the defense and passed the ball to a teammate; it means they automatically become floor spacers and must act accordingly by repositioning to, in turn, offer a passing angle in an efficient zone. This is exactly what Seth Curry immediately does here after creating an advantage and assisting KJ Simpson, allowing him to capitalize on the momentary lapse of Cade Cunningham & Jalen Duren:

 

 

Those three key principles of spacing, to truly work beyond their theoretical validity, must be coupled with an imperative: quick decision-making at ball’s reception. In the NBA, perhaps even more than elsewhere, the advantages generated are fleeting and can only be punished if they are immediately exploited (whether through a shot, attacking a closeout or freeing up for an extra pass). The speed of the decision may sometimes lead to a poor choice or some degree of imprecision in execution; however, it’s often less detrimental than a lack of decision leading to ball stagnation.

 

THE ADVENT OF DYNAMIC SPACING

 

The central role spacing gradually assumed in the strategic thinking behind NBA’s offenses is undoubtedly the cornerstone of the effectiveness surge over the past 25 years. All the uses of floor spacers discussed so far have proven crucial in achieving better offensive results; however, they all share a common trait: they consider the floor spacer as a static weapon placed in a dangerous zone on the floor (except for screen setters in the main action).

This stagnant positioning has some advantages, notably simplifying offensive schemes for the players. But it also raises the issue of predictability for the defense: staticity inherently makes anticipation easier, allowing a defense under pressure to execute defensive rotations relatively quickly. Another underlying issue is the difficulty of keeping certain defensively forceful players on the court who are relatively ineffective as floor spacers. Failing to punish the defense in these high-yield zones, they are often neglected by their matchup, who prioritizes roaming near the rim.

These two issues created by static spacing have at least partially been addressed by adopting a more movement-oriented approach. The goal remains the same, which is complicate the defense’s job by making any potential help difficult and punishable, this time by:

1° Encouraging more movement to create confusion, destabilizing the opponent’s defensive rotations

2° Or further optimizing the physical distance the defense must cover by setting screens between floor spacers

These tools, although not new, are increasingly used by all NBA teams, who are combining primary actions involving the ball handler with secondary movements, thus forcing defenders assigned to floor spacers to navigate not only between two spatially distant threats but also, and more importantly, two distinct dynamics.

This logic is at work in the traditional “corner lift” movement on pick & roll, where Devin Vassell moves up from the corner to 45° during Victor Wembanyama’s roll, forcing Bilal Coulibaly to make a clear decision between helping at the rim or sticking with his assignment on Vassell:

 

 

Another extremely common movement: the cutting of one of the floor spacers when two of them are on the same side in an overload situation. Here, Tobias Harris’ cut complicates Tari Eason’s task, as he can no longer “just float” and needs to follow the cutter, leaving an open shot for Malik Beasley:

 

 

Some of these relatively simple movements used as decoys regularly occurred on NBA courts, such as this basic positional exchange weakside between Andrew Wiggins & Stephen Curry to draw their defender’s attention (heavily favored, of course, by the latter’s gravity):

 

 

When floor spacers initiate movement, the inaugural spatial setup tends to change: it’s often not optimal at the beginning of the play, as the goal for floor spacers is to be in their preferred zone as the advantage occurs, not necessarily beforehand. This is the case for Isaiah Joe, who moves to the top of the key during Shaï Gilgeous-Alexander’s pick & pop action and takes advantage of Jayson Tatum’s hesitation to help at the rim to get an open shot:

 

 

This very same movement can also allow to pull a deterrent defender away from the rim. This is evident in this play, where Trey Murphy III’s repositioning forces Keegan Murray to vacate the paint, transferring the responsibility of alter Zion Williamson’s drive to the smaller Malik Monk:

 

 

Even more original is the use of a floor spacer initially occupying the dunker spot who then moves back to the corner (freed up by Santi Aldama) when his defender must help at the rim. Jay Huff moves from one high-yield zone to another, increasing the distance from his defender in the process, and gets a completely open shot:

 

 

As mentioned earlier, these movements can be combined with off-ball screens between floor spacers to enhance the threat they pose to the defense and free up significant space for players involved in the main action. This is obvious in this play initiated by Luka Dončić, where Kyrie Irving’s baseline movement to use the exit screen set by P.J. Washington eliminates any possible help on the alley-oop for Dereck Lively II:

 

 

These types of screens can also cause defensive mistakes and create even more space for floor spacers than if they had simply remained parked in the corner. Here, Cam Johnson is able to take a wide open 3 as Ziaire Williams sets an exit screen on his own defender, exploiting the miscommunication on Kyshawn George and Jordan Poole’s switch:

 

 

These off-ball screens also allow the integration of certain players into spacing configurations where their ability to generate offensive efficiency might have been debated. Some mediocre shooters, for example, are used in peripheral areas as screen setters to free up players who are effective in those spaces. An illustration with Paul Reed, who, alongside the main action, sets a hammer screen for Buddy Hield, allowing him to shoot before Scotty Pippen Jr., caught in the screen, can recover:

 

 

A nearly identical role is assigned to Anthony Davis, standing in the corner despite an unreliable shooting percentage from that area. This time, the screen occurs after the ball reception, taking the form of a handoff to free up Dalton Knecht from Shai Gilgeous-Alexander before Isaiah Hartenstein can recover. The latter had been roaming the paint, unbothered by the risk of his matchup’s presence on the perimeter:

 

 

This final example, along with all the previous ones, demonstrates how the assimilation of court multipolarity as strategic software has significantly wounded NBA defenses, caught between two conflicting imperatives: the need to protect the rim and to limit opportunities beyond the three-point line. Trapped between players positioned in increasingly efficient zones, defenders’ ability to react has inevitably diminished as the distances they must cover have expanded.

Unfortunately for them, and until proven wrong, the ball remains quicker than defenders, especially when obstacles stand in their way, or when they’re running in the wrong direction.

 

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